

# Towards Provenance for Cybersecurity in Cloud-Native Production Infrastructure

DSN 2025 Doctoral Forum

**Paul R. B. Houssel<sup>1,2</sup>   Sylvie Laniepce<sup>1</sup>   Olivier Levillain<sup>2</sup>**

<sup>1</sup>Orange Research, Caen, France

<sup>2</sup>Institut Polytechnique de Paris, SAMOVAR, Télécom SudParis, Palaiseau, France

June 25, 2025




INSTITUT  
POLYTECHNIQUE  
DE PARIS

# Provenance Graphs

- interactions between system subjects and objects
- understand system behavior, establish causality

# Provenance Graphs

- interactions between system subjects and objects
- understand system behavior, establish causality
- threat detection
  - ▶ sub-graph embedding [1]
  - ▶ graph queries [2]
  - ▶ benign behavior model [1, 3]
- forensics
  - ▶ post-mortem root cause analysis [4]
  - ▶ active threat hunting [5]




# PhD Research Plan

# Cloud-Native: An emerging infrastructure shift

## Telemetry Collection for Cloud-Native production environments

- fine-grained, per-container telemetry
- distinguish container and host activity
- handle large system activity
- uniquely identify system objects



# Telemetry Collection for Provenance

Location	Approach	Efficiency	Visibility	Safety	Portability	Example
user land	ptrace, fs snapshot	○	○	●	●	strace [6], ARTISAN [7]
	integrated tool	●	●	●	○	ftrace [8], auditd [9]
kernel	kernel module	●	●	○	●	SELinux [10], CamFlow [4]
	eBPF	●	●	●	●	falco [11], tetragon [12]

# Telemetry Collection for Provenance

Location	Approach	Efficiency	Visibility	Safety	Portability	Example
user land	ptrace, fs snapshot	○	○	●	●	strace [6], ARTISAN [7]
	integrated tool	●	●	●	○	ftrace [8], auditd [9]
kernel	kernel module	●	●	○	●	SELinux [10], CamFlow [4]
	eBPF	●	●	●	●	falco [11], tetragon [12]


# Telemetry Collection for Provenance

Location	Approach	Efficiency	Visibility	Safety	Portability	Example
user land	ptrace, fs snapshot	○	○	●	●	strace [6], ARTISAN [7]
	integrated tool	●	●	●	○	ftrace [8], auditd [9]
kernel	kernel module	●	●	○	●	SELinux [10], CamFlow [4]
	eBPF	●	●	●	●	falco [11], tetragon [12]


# Telemetry Collection for Provenance

Location	Approach	Efficiency	Visibility	Safety	Portability	Example
user land	ptrace, fs snapshot	○	○	●	●	strace [6], ARTISAN [7]
	integrated tools	●	●	●	○	ftrace [8], auditd [9]
	kernel module	●	●	○	●	SELinux [10], CamFlow [4]
	eBPF	●	●	●	●	falco [11], tetragon [12]

# Linux Security Module (LSM) hooks



# Linux Security Module (LSM) hooks



## Preliminary Results and Future Work

# Coverage: sufficient system visibility for sound provenance ?

# Coverage: sufficient system visibility for sound provenance ?

## Objective

relationship between system calls and LSM hooks

## Method

static analysis of Linux kernel source code (v6.13)

- cflow (call graphs) [13]
- cscope (code navigation) [14]

## Coverage: sufficient system visibility for sound provenance ?


## Objective

## relationship between system calls and LSM hooks

## Method


## static analysis of Linux kernel source code (v6.13)

- cflow (call graphs) [13]
- cscope (code navigation) [14]




# Coverage Analysis (*Syscall* $\leftrightarrow$ *LSM*)

## Limitations



# Coverage Analysis (*Syscall* $\leftrightarrow$ *LSM*)

## Limitations



- indirect function calls
- function exported from a kernel module
- conditional branching is not considered

# Stability across kernel versions compared to system calls

# Stability across kernel versions compared to system calls

## Objective

compare the rate of change in LSM hook interfaces vs. system call interfaces

## Method

track Application Binary Interface (ABI) changes across kernel versions

- added functions
- removed functions
- signature changes

# Stability across kernel versions compared to system calls

- backwards compatibility
- LSM and interface has grown substantially
- frequent changes:
  - ▶ additions
  - ▶ removals
  - ▶ renaming
  - ▶ argument modifications

Linux version	Release date	LSM hooks	Argument changes	System calls	Argument changes
2.6.12	2005-06-17	=131	-	=251	-
2.6.30	2009-06-09	+72/-22	19	+79/-0	8
3.1	2011-10-24	+17/-14	8	+17/-1	15
3.12	2013-11-03	+12/-4	12	+13/-0	16
4.1	2015-06-21	+7/-2	3	+9/-0	4
4.12	2017-07-02	+8/-3	19	+10/-0	5
5.1	2019-05-05	+23/-4	24	+37/-0	27
5.12	2021-04-25	+16/-2	26	+15/-1	13
6.1	2022-12-11	+10/-2	10	+8/-1	0
6.12	2024-11-17	+33/-8	20	+14/-1	7
6.13	2025-01-19	+6/-4	1	+4/-0	0

# Conclusion

## Future Work

- refine coverage analysis
  - ▶ advanced static tools like Kayrebt [15]
  - ▶ fuzzing-based dynamic analysis [16]
- identify missing LSM hooks to cover kernel object
  - ▶ allocation
  - ▶ activity
  - ▶ information flow
- qualify the ABI changes

# Towards Provenance for Cybersecurity in Cloud-Native Production Infrastructure

DSN 2025 Doctoral Forum

**Paul R. B. Houssel<sup>1,2</sup>   Sylvie Laniepce<sup>1</sup>   Olivier Levillain<sup>2</sup>**

<sup>1</sup>Orange Research, Caen, France

<sup>2</sup>Institut Polytechnique de Paris, SAMOVAR, Télécom SudParis, Palaiseau, France

June 25, 2025



# References I

-  T. Song, M. Organokov, L. Gulikers, G. Grassi, G. Carofiglio, and M. Meo, “Advancing Cloud-Native Cyber Threat Detection with Graph-Based Feature Engineering,” pp. 4291–4297, IEEE Computer Society, May 2025.  
ISSN: 2375-026X.
-  W. Blair, F. Araujo, T. Taylor, and J. Jang, “Automated Synthesis of Effect Graph Policies for Microservice-Aware Stateful System Call Specialization,” in 2024 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP), pp. 4554–4572, May 2024.  
ISSN: 2375-1207.
-  B. Jiang, T. Bilot, N. E. Madhoun, K. A. Agha, A. Zouaoui, S. Iqbal, X. Han, and T. Pasquier, “ORTHRUS: Achieving High Quality of Attribution in Provenance-based Intrusion Detection Systems,” 2025.

## References II

-  T. Pasquier, X. Han, M. Goldstein, T. Moyer, D. Evers, M. Seltzer, and J. Bacon, “Practical whole-system provenance capture,” in Proceedings of the 2017 Symposium on Cloud Computing, (Santa Clara, California, US), pp. 405–418, ACM, Sept. 2017.
-  J. Li, R. Zhang, J. Liu, and G. Liu, “LogKernel: A Threat Hunting Approach Based on Behaviour Provenance Graph and Graph Kernel Clustering,” Security and Communication Networks, vol. 2022, no. 1, p. 4577141, 2022. \_eprint: <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1155/2022/4577141>.
-  “strace - the linux syscall tracer,” 1991.

## References III

-  L. Yu, Y. Ye, Z. Zhang, and X. Zhang, “Cost-effective Attack Forensics by Recording and Correlating File System Changes,” in Proceedings of the 33rd USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 24), (Philadelphia, PA, USA), 2024.
-  “ftrace - Function Tracer – The Linux Kernel documentation.”
-  “auditd - The Linux Audit daemon,” 1994.
-  S. Smalley, C. Vance, and W. Salamon, Implementing SELinux as a Linux security module.  
NAI Labs Report, 2001.
-  “Falco: open source security tool for containers, kubernetes and cloud,” 2014.  
original-date: 2021-02-08T14:46:41Z.

## References IV

- “Tetragon - eBPF-based Security Observability and Runtime Enforcement,” 2022.
- “Cflow - GNU Project - Free Software Foundation.”
- “cscope - interactively examine a C program,” 2002.
- L. Georget, F. Tronel, and V. V. T. Tong, “Kayrebt: An activity diagram extraction and visualization toolset designed for the Linux codebase,” in 2015 IEEE 3rd Working Conference on Software Visualization (VISSOFT), (Bremen, Germany), pp. 170–174, IEEE, Sept. 2015.
- D. Jones, “Trinity: A Linux system call fuzzer.”
- R. Guo and J. Zeng, “Phantom Attack: Evading System Call Monitoring,” 2021.

# Stability Analysis (ABI Evolution)

Kernel	Release Date	# LSM Hook name changes	Modified function names	# LSM Hook Parameter changes	Modified Parameters	Total Syscalls	Changes from Previous	# Syscall Parameter changes
6.13	2025-01-19	+6/-4	current_getlsmprop_subj, lsmprop_to_secctx, inode_getlsmprop, cred_getlsmprop, task_getlsmprop_obj, ipc_getlsmprop <del>task_getsecid_obj</del> , <del>ipc_getsecid</del> , <del>current_getsecid_subj</del> , <del>inode_getsecid</del>	1	audit_rule_match: structlsm_prop*prop, u32secid	+4/-0	removexattrat, getxattrat, listxattrat, setxattrat	0

# eBPF attachments

Program type	Attach type	TOCTOU resistant [17]	Granularity					Stable	Kernel ≥
			system	Calls	kfunc.	ufunc.	AC op.		
LSM	LSM_MAC	●	○	○	○	●	●	●	5.7
tracepoint	tracepoint	▷	●	▷	○	○	○	●	4.7
kprobe	kprobe	▷	●	●	●	●	○	○	4.1
tracing	fentry	▷	●	●	●	●	○	○	5.1